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Abstract: With the move to more electric aircraft (MEA), a key area of investigation is the development of commercially viable
systems which are reliable, efficient, low mass, and are compatible and commensurate with the power and multiplex
requirements of current and future aircraft. In rotorcraft, the pace of adopting more electric systems, to replace conventional
mechanical and hydraulic ones, say, is perceived as being much lower than in fixed wing aircraft. However, recently there has
been growing evidence to suggest that a quadruplex electric tail rotor (ETR) is a technically viable solution. This paper shows
the methodology to support the most reliable configuration of the four independent generators required to power such a
quadruplex tail rotor drive, and takes account of the failure severity due to power loss in each independent channel, target
reliability setting, and supporting reliability analyses. The conclusions drawn support a particular hybrid series-parallel
configuration of generators, with identification of further work related to the gearbox reliabilities which support the reliability
attainment for the configuration.
1 Introduction
The development of the more electric aircraft (MEA) has, until
recently, primarily focussed on the electrification of non-propulsive
aerospace systems. Through this process, functions such as
environmental control, engine start, and flight surface actuation,
traditionally powered by hydraulic or pneumatic sources, are being
implemented electrically. This evolution has been most prevalent in
the fixed-wing sector and is expected to convey several benefits in
particular reduced maintenance costs, and recued fuel burn.
However, to achieve complete electrification of an aircraft's
auxiliary systems, further innovation is required in power
conversion technology, such as improved power density, increased
reliability and advances in fault tolerance. It is also perceived that
the more traditional power systems fail more gradually than
electrical machines, where in the latter, a sudden loss of power
could be experienced, therefore, the introduction of multiplex
systems is also crucial to improve reliability of electrical power
systems on aircraft, but potentially with the disadvantages of
adding more mass, cost, and complexity [1].
Recently, a clean sky green rotorcraft (GRC) program, funded
by the European Union, has investigated the technical viability of
powering the tail rotor of a helicopter using an electric drive. This
replaces the mechanical transmission and gearbox arrangement
currently employed [2]. This electric tail rotor (ETR) system has a
quadruplex fault tolerant configuration and comprises four
independently controlled power channels which share load evenly
during normal operation. The removal of direct mechanical
coupling from the main rotor offers new modes of operation, for
example, variable tail rotor speed can be achieved independent of
the main rotor for increased manoeuvrability under certain flight
conditions. Although not a propulsion system outright, ETR
represents a major advancement in more electric rotorcraft [3].
Traditionally, rotorcraft have had very low levels of installed
electric power, primarily serving avionics and wing ice protection
systems. The ETR project is currently at the ground testing phase
[4].
The feasibility of the ETR concept is dependent upon the
availability of a weight compatible source of electrical power
generation, and for a quadruplex drive, four independent channels
of power must be configured on board the helicopter. The current
capacity of electrical power generation on existing rotorcraft is far
below that required by an ETR system (∼200 kW), and the state-
of-the-art wound field generators used in fixed wing applications
are not necessarily suited to the high-vibration environment found
on rotorcraft. High-speed surface-mounted PM (SMPM) machines
are being increasingly investigated for direct-drive generators such
as this. They have great potential for high reliability, compactness,
low weight, high efficiency, high power density, low acoustic
noise, and low maintenance costs In this project, a continuously
rated 50 kW SMPM generator has been designed to withstand
harsh rotorcraft environmental conditions, while providing robust
and reliable performance typical of permanent magnet (PM)
electrical machines. The cooling and lubrication has also been
designed to integrate with the existing oil circuit for the main rotor
gearbox and meets the on-board electrical specification of existing
rotorcraft.
Here, a methodology is presented for defining the most
appropriate configuration of the four generators for a quadruplex
ETR drive. The objective is to minimise the footprint of the
installation, and its complexity, while attaining maximum
reliability of the system.
2 Methodology
2.1 System reliability theory
Reliability can be defined as the ability of a component, or system
of components, to perform their required function under the stated
conditions, for a specified period of time. The equations to predict
the reliability of a system of components, such as series and
parallel as shown in Fig. 1, are provided in (1) and (2), respectively
[5].
Rsys(series) = R1 × R2 × R3 ×…Rn (1)
Rsys(parallel) = 1 − (1 − Ri)n (2)
where Rsys = reliability of the system; n = number of components;
Ri = reliability of ith component (of the same reliability) in a
system; R1,2,…n = reliability of independent components. 
A ‘k-out-of-n’ reliability assessment is often used for
redundancy evaluation in fault-tolerant systems i.e. not all
components in the system are operational [6]. The reliability of the
system with redundancy is provided in (3):
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Rsys(Redundancy) = ∑
r = k
n n
r
RCr (1 − RC)n − r (3)
where RC = reliability of component (of the same reliability); k = 
minimum number of components in system for operation.
From these equations, any configuration of components can be
analysed in terms of overall system reliability; or having set a
target reliability for the system, provide the component reliabilities.
2.2 Setting target reliabilities
For any reliability prediction methodology to be practical, a
decision must be made as to the reliability target appropriate for the
application [7]. An appreciation of the severity of failure
consequence together with failure probability i.e. risk would be
useful because components and systems need to be more reliable in
safety critical cases. Research into the effects of non-conformance
and associated costs of failure found that an area of acceptable
design can be defined for failure occurrence versus severity of
consequence [8].
Here, there are the two elements of risk – Occurrence, or how
many times do we expect the failure to occur? – and severity, what
are the consequences? In very complex systems, severe
consequences can result from the failure of a single component.
The implication is that reliability of the system is relatively
insensitive to the number of components, and, therefore, their
configuration and the reliability is determined by their weakest
link. If the weakest component can endure the most severe duty
without failing, the system will be completely reliable. This
assumption forms the basis of target reliability selection against
which each configuration will be assessed later. Target reliabilities
should also be set to achieve minimum failure cost [9].
From these arguments, acceptable limits of failure probability
relative to a FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality
Analysis) Severity (S) Scale from 1 (little or no effect) to 5
(catastrophic consequence) can be drawn on a Reliability Map, as
shown in Fig. 2 [8, 10]. The map includes areas associated with
acceptable, unacceptable, conservative, and overdesign. The
overdesign area is probably not as important as the minimum
reliability for a particular severity rating, but does identify possible
wasteful and costly designs. The integrated use of FMECA in the
setting of reliability targets utilises information from an already
well utilised technique in industry; with ∼70% of companies using
it in the UK to identify potential failure modes and prioritise risk
[11]. 
Using the reliability map to set targets is also shown on Fig. 2,
for example, for Severity Ratings (S) = 4 and 5, where:
• Severity Rating (S) = 4; Rsys > 0.9999994;
• Severity Rating (S) = 5; Rsys > 0.999999993.
Focusing on the application here, the Severity Rating (S) from 1 to
5, for the loss of independent power channels (loss of one, two and
three generators), was agreed through a team-based exercise with
all stakeholders, and the definitions and results are shown in Fig. 3.
The loss of two or three, out of the four generators, in terms of
power delivery, has a severe or catastrophic consequence on the
flight stability of the helicopter, while the loss of one generator is
tolerable. 
2.3 Generator configurations
In developing a reliable system, a number of design schemes
should be generated to explore each for their ability to meet the
target reliability. Several schemes, or configurations, of generator
are considered to be possible in the specification envelope for the
target helicopter platform (see Fig. 4). These are: all in series (e.g.
on a common shaft), all in parallel, and parallel-series (two parallel
channels of two generators in series). The second and third
configurations need to be evaluated together with a splitter gearbox
and all three together with a Central Control Unit (CCU) (not
included in the analysis), but that is not considered here. Each
configuration needs to be assessed to meet a target system
reliability, as described in Section 2.2. 
Fig. 1  Series and parallel components in a system
 
Fig. 2  Reliability map based on FMECA severity ratings (target
reliabilities shown at severity rating (S) = 4 and 5)
 
Fig. 3  FMECA severity ratings (S) for a quadruplex ETR system for loss
of power channels
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3 Analysis and results
Several assumptions are used in the analysis of the generator
configurations:
• The output shaft from the main gearbox is considered to be
intrinsically reliable, R ≈ 1.
• The output shaft from the main helicopter gearbox will need to
be split – hence a ‘splitter gearbox’ immediately before the bank
of four generators in the different configurations, other than
series one.
• Each generator has the same reliability and is independent from
the others.
• The system reliability targets are a minimum.
• Initially, the study looks at generator reliabilities needed for
different system configurations, then a system which is
operational only with two out of four generators working (k out
of n system).
Fig. 5 shows the analysis of each configuration in terms of its
ability to meet a target system reliability, based on Severity Ratings
(S) 4 and 5, and the subsequent generator reliability needed to meet
the system reliability. Note, at this stage, no account is taken of the
splitter gearbox needed, as a baseline evaluation. It is clear,
understandably, that the series configuration requires generator
probability of failure of two parts in a billion in order to function
with all four generators providing power. The generator reliabilities
relax somewhat for the other configurations and are far more
realisable in practice. 
In Fig. 6, the inclusion of the splitter gearbox for the two
configurations requiring it is included. For the fully parallel
configuration, a four-way split is needed; whereas for the parallel-
series hybrid configuration, a two-way split from the main rotor
gearbox shaft is required. In order to solve for the generator
reliability, the splitter gearbox reliability needs to be of the same
reliability as the whole system, the validity of which will be
commented on later. The inclusion of a series gearbox has a
marginal impact on the generator reliabilities required for each
severity rating-based target, as you would expect given the
assumed high reliability, and is useful for model building (the CCU
reliability can be added in the same way if known). It also shows
that even with a splitter gearbox of high reliability, up to 2%
improvement in generator reliability is required to main system
reliability targets. 
Fig. 7 shows the results for the ‘k out of n’ analysis for Severity
Rating (S) = 4, where two out of the four channels have been lost
on a purely parallel configuration. Fig. 8 shows the same situation,
but for the parallel-series configuration where ‘1 out of 2’ channels
is lost (equivalent to ‘2 out of 4’ for this configuration). The
solutions to the equations are through iteration, and no splitter
gearbox in series is included at this stage. Comparing the generator
reliabilities needed to meet the system target, the generator for the
parallel configuration approaches unity, compared to a more
attainable value for the hybrid configuration. There is the
additional requirement of a four-way splitter gearbox for the purely
parallel configuration, and so this configuration looks more
unlikely as a final system. 
Finally, a parallel-series configuration is considered, with
Severity Rating (S) = 4, but with the inclusion of a splitter gearbox
in series. The reliability of each generator approaches unity due to
the reliability of the splitter gearbox, even though it was set at the
system reliability target (see Fig. 9). 
4 Conclusions
The methodology, model development, and key results from a
system reliability approach to analyse the most favourable
configuration of generator for a future quadruplex ETR has been
discussed. This included a reliability target setting approach based
on failure mode/severity, and the application of reliability analyses
for redundant systems, for quadruplex systems.
In summary, the parallel-series (hybrid) configuration of
generators has been found to be the most promising in terms of
meeting reliability targets for such a system and occupies a low
footprint within the helicopter platform – not overly long like a
series system, or overly wide like parallel system of generators.
However, an individual generator reliability, RG > 0.999999,
even for the Severity Rating (S) = 4 case, is still difficult to verify
at this stage whether it is attainable (equates to 1 part per million
failure rate). A priority direction for the work is to evaluate the
Fig. 4  Generator configurations (where: RSG = splitter gearbox
reliability, RG = generator reliability, RCCU = central control unit
reliability)
 
Fig. 5  Basic generator reliabilities for each configuration
 
Fig. 6  Basic generator reliabilities for configurations including the
splitter gearbox
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reliabilities of additional (splitter) gearboxes, compared to the
effort of redesigning the main rotor gearbox to have two
independent variable speed output shafts (one currently, which has
the purpose of mechanically driving the tail rotor through a
gearbox). Typically, gearbox reliabilities range from ∼0.999 to
∼0.999999 [12], and, therefore, could be a weak link in the
proposed configuration of generators to power ETR. The exclusion
of gearboxes, as far as possible, is needed to meet system-level
reliability targets. Generator reliabilities are marginally better than
gearboxes in terms of failure rate, but still the expectation is that
generator reliabilities equivalent to <1 part in a million will be
required.
5 Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to the industrial collaborator, Leornardo
Helicopters, Yeovil, UK, for the funding of this research, and in
particular Keith Stickels and Martin Barber are thanked for their
contribution.
6 References
[1] Moir, I., Seabridge, A.: ‘Aircraft systems: mechanical, electrical and avionics
subsystems integration’ (Wiley, New York, 2011, 3rd Edn.)
[2] Mellor, P.H., Yon, J., Baker, J.L., et al.: ‘Electromagnetic and thermal
coupling within a fault tolerant aircraft propulsion motor’. Proc. IEEE Int.
Electrical Machines & Drives Conf. (IEMDC 17), Miami, US, 21–24 May
2017, Paper No. WO241 (2017)
[3] Gazzino, M.: ‘State of the Art of more electric helicopter’. Proc. More
Electric Aircraft Conf. (MEA 2012), Bordeaux, France, 20–21 November
2012, Paper No. 1–4
[4] Stickels, K., Brunetti, M., Barber, M., et al.: ‘Advances in helicopter electric
tail rotor drive’. Proc. 43rd European Rotorcraft Forum, Milan, Italy, 12–15
September 2017, Paper No. 662
[5] Pham, H.: ‘Handbook of reliability engineering’ (Springer, London, 2003)
[6] Myers, A.: ‘Complex system reliability: multichannel systems with imperfect
fault coverage’ (Springer, London, 2014)
[7] Ditlevsen, O.: ‘Structural reliability codes for probabilistic design’, Struct.
Saf., 1997, 19, (3), pp. 253–270
[8] Booker, J.D., Raines, M., Swift, K.G.: ‘Designing capable and reliable
products’ (Butterworth- Heinemann, Oxford, 2001)
[9] Carter, D.S.: ‘Mechanical reliability and design’ (Macmillan, London, 1997)
[10] Goh, Y.M., McMahon, C.A., Booker, J.D.: ‘Improved utility and application
of probabilistic methods for reliable mechanical design’, Proc. Inst. Mech.
Eng. O, 2009, 223, (6), pp. 199–214
[11] Booker, J.D.: ‘A survey-based methodology for prioritising the industrial
implementation qualities of design tools’, J. Eng. Des., 2012, 23, (7), pp.
507–525
[12] Denson, W., Chandler, G., Crowell, W., et al.: ‘Nonelectronic parts reliability
data’ (Reliability Analysis Center Griffiss AFB, New York, 1995)
Fig. 7  k out of n System reliability (2 out of 4) for parallel configuration of
generators
 
Fig. 8  k out of n System reliability (1 out of 2) for parallel-series
configuration of generators
 
Fig. 9  k out of n System reliability (1 out of 2) for parallel-series
configuration of generators, with splitter gearbox
 
4 J. Eng.
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/)
